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New Approaches to Enforcing Labor Standards:
How Co-enforcement Partnerships between
Government and Civil Society Are Showing the
Way Forward
Janice Fine†

INTRODUCTION: ENFORCEMENT IN CRISIS
For many low-wage workers, non-compliance with basic labor
standards and health and safety laws by businesses of all sizes has become the new normal. In 2013, an average of eighty-eight workers died
on the job every single week—more than twelve workers a day.1 Foreign-born Latinos were especially vulnerable, averaging fifteen deaths
a week. Many workplace injuries are preventable: in 2014, there were
more than 6000 OSHA citations issued for businesses lacking fall protection for their workers, over 5000 for not communicating dangerous
workplace hazards, 4000 for not having proper scaffolding, and over
3000 for not providing adequate respiratory protection.
In addition to workplace hazards, wage theft is rife in low-wage
sectors. A 2009 study in the nation’s three largest cities—New York,
Chicago, and Los Angeles—found that 26% of workers2 suffered minimum wage violations in the week prior to being surveyed, and that over
76% of those who had labored more than forty hours in the prior week
had not been paid according to overtime laws.3 In some regions, the US
Department of Labor (DOL) itself recorded Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) compliance levels below 50% in industries such as nursing

†

Associate Professor at Rutgers University School of Management and Labor Relations; Research and Strategy Director at the Center for Innovation in Worker Organization (CIWO). Research on the cases discussed in this paper was made possible by a grant from the LIFT Fund.
1
Rebecca Thiess, The Future of Work: Trends and Challenges for Low-Wage Workers, ECON.
POL’Y INST. (April 27, 2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/bp341-future-of-work/ [https://perma.
cc/TN4T-PNC9].
2
Steven Greenhouse, Low-Wage Workers Are Often Cheated, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/02/us/02wage.html [https://perma.cc/VV7Q-R6YA].
3
NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, LOCAL LIVING WAGE LAWS AND COVERAGE (July 2011),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/LocalLWLawsCoverageFINAL.pdf?nocdn=1 [https:
//perma.cc/TM9T-9BFF].
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homes, poultry processing, daycare, and restaurants.4 In 2013, the
Southern Poverty Law Center found that 41% of Latino immigrants
working in the agriculture, construction, hospitality, and poultry processing industries in Nashville, Charlotte, New Orleans, rural southern
Georgia and several towns and cities in northern Alabama had also experienced wage theft. In New Orleans, a staggering 80% of workers surveyed reported having experienced wage theft.5 Most recently, in a
study conducted on behalf of the DOL, the Eastern Research Group
found that in 2014 between 3.5 and 6.5% of all wage and salary workers
in California and New York were paid less than the minimum wage and
estimated that more than 300,000 workers in every state suffered minimum-wage violations each month.6 Why is non-compliance in certain
sectors so high?
Firms comply with health and safety and minimum wage laws for
one of three reasons: 1) economic—it costs them less to comply than to
risk fines and penalties; 2) social—they don’t want to be unfavorably
compared to others in their industry; and 3) normative—they believe it
is the right thing to do.7 Unfortunately, for too many employers of lowwage workers, economic motives overwhelm the social and normative.
The desire to cut costs and limit liability has contributed to the “fissuring” of the employment relationship8 in which companies have shifted
direct employment of workers to other business entities through heightened subcontracting, increased use of fixed-term contracts, temporary
staffing agencies and independent contracting arrangements. In reaction to tight competition and thinner profit margins, subcontractors are
strongly incentivized to cut costs wherever they can and low-road practices have become normalized across many labor markets. Those firms
that want to maintain higher standards are placed at an enormous disadvantage. A systemic transformation is needed.

4

What’s the Minimum Wage in your State?, RAISE THE MINIMUM WAGE, http://raisethemini
mumwage.com/minimum-wage-state/ [https://perma.cc/TE2L-6LG8].
5
S. POVERTY LAW CTR., UNDER SIEGE: LIFE FOR LOW-INCOME LATINOS IN THE SOUTH (Mar.
31, 2009), https://www.splcenter.org/20090401/under-siege-life-low-income-latinos-south [https://
perma.cc/MF8D-BVG4].
6
E. RESEARCH GROUP, INC., THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF WAGE VIOLATIONS:
ESTIMATES FOR CALIFORNIA AND NEW YORK (Dec. 2014), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/com
pleted-studies/WageViolationsReportDecember2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD2H-KV5H].
7
Robert A. Kagan et al., Fear, Duty and Regulatory Compliance: Lessons from Three Research
Projects, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION, 37–58 (Christine
Parker and Vibeke Lehmann eds., 2011).
8
DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014).
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To increase compliance, Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has been
targeting specific high-risk industries in which there is a lot of subcontracting, independent contracting and reliance on temporary workers
for intensive inspection. WHD’s strategic enforcement strategy entails
focusing at the top of industry structures, targeting entire business entities rather than individual workplaces, holding joint employers liable
for violations and expanding the use of the “hot goods” provision of
FLSA.9 This strategy targets highly non-compliant industries and takes
advantage of industry-specific dynamics and structures to impact networks of interconnected employers. In strategic enforcement, the
agency also analyzes the regulatory regimes under which specific industries operate and retrofits the enforcement approach to utilize the
specific pressure points created by these laws and regulations.
Complaint-based enforcement had been the dominant approach
taken by the federal government for many years, but by FY 2012, directed investigations based on strategic enforcement accounted for over
40% of the total and by FY 2015, it had climbed to a remarkable 46%.
These numbers are unprecedented in the history of the WHD and the
ascendance of strategic enforcement into a co-equal position with complaint-based enforcement is a major step forward. However, this paper
argues that for strategic enforcement to fulfill its promise, there must
be a means for workers, worker organizations, and high road firms to
take part.
Government does not, and likely will not ever, have enough investigators to monitor US establishments.10 But, it is also true that government is very unlikely to have as much information about conditions
on the ground as workers in the workplace do, or have the relationships
with vulnerable workers that strong organizations have. Nevertheless,
most proposals to improve labor standards enforcement in recent years
focus attention away from the latent resources in society that are essential for responding to the crisis of enforcement, often relegating
workers to passive victims and worker organizations to providing armslength political support for enforcement and little else.
Effective deterrence in low wage sectors necessitates co-enforcement: worker, worker organization, and high road firm participation in
enforcement, and greater transparency between government, workers
and worker organizations. Without the tacit knowledge that workers
9

US DEP’T OF LABOR, WAGE & HOUR DIV., FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION
(2011), https://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2012/PDF/CBJ-2012-V2-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX2T-LF
QG].
10
ANNETTE BERNHARDT & SIOBHÁN MCGRATH, TRENDS IN WAGE AND HOUR ENFORCEMENT BY
THE US DEPT. OF LABOR, 1975-2004 (Sept. 2005), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
legacy/d/download_file_35553.pdf [https://perma.cc/66FX-9GK7].
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have about workplace practices and problems and the relationships
they have with worker organizations, government will never have the
trust required for vulnerable workers to come forward, nor the information they can provide as a result.
A broad attack on the problem of noncompliance in low-wage work
requires serious reconsideration of a formal role for workers and workers’ organizations in government enforcement efforts. Routine, institutionalized collaborations between these organizations and federal, state
and local Departments of Labor has the potential to address many of
the gaps identified in government efforts to enforce labor standards in
the low-wage context. Previous research by Fine and Gordon (2010) and
Fine (2013), profiled several contemporary examples of tripartism at
the local, state and federal levels. Support from the LIFT Fund in 2014
made the exploration of additional cases—now viewed through the lens
of a conceptual framework of co-enforcement—possible.11
The paper proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief literature review that situates our proposal in the scholarly literature, Part II is an
elaboration of the key design principles, Part III provides two contemporary case studies at the federal, state, and local levels, and Part IV
provides a cross-case analysis and conclusions.
I.

CO-ENFORCEMENT IN CONTEXT12

Co-enforcement is when unions, worker centers and other community-based non-profit organizations and high-road firms, in relationship
with government inspectors, help educate workers on their rights and
patrol their labor markets to identify businesses engaged in unethical
and illegal practices.13 In contrast to government contracting with a

See generally Janice Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society:
Can Co-enforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?, 45 POL. & SOC’Y 359 (2017).
12
See generally JANICE FINE, CO-PRODUCTION: BRINGING TOGETHER THE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY FOR STRONGER LABOR STANDARDS AND ENFORCEMENT
(2013), http://theliftfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LIFTReportCoproductionOct_ExecSum
m-rf_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/VFQ6-CS3T]; Fine, supra note 11.
13
Co-enforcement as put forward in this paper was developed by Amengual and Fine, draws
heavily upon Fine and Gordon, from Josh Cohen and Joel Rogers’ proposals about associative democracy as well as tripartism as envisioned by Ayres and Braithwaite. See Ian Ayres & John
Braithwaite, Chapter 3: Tripartism, in RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Anuradha Joshi & Mick Moore, Institutionalized Co-production:
Unorthodox Public Service Delivery in Challenging Environments, 40 J. OF DEV. STUD. 31, 40
(2004); FINE, supra note 12; Tony Bovaird, Beyond Engagement and Participation: User and Community Coproduction of Public Services, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 846–60 (2007); Joshua Cohen & Joel
Rogers, Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance, 20 POL. & SOC’Y 393–472 (1992);
Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552–85 (2010); Elinor Ostrom, Crossing the
Great Divide: Co-Enforcement, Synergy and Development, 24 WORLD DEV. 1073–87 (1996).
11
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third party to take over a service previously delivered by a government
agency, co-enforcement is intended to complement rather than replace
government enforcement capacity.
With co-enforcement, we shift from conceptualizing state capacity
for enforcement as arising primarily from regulators with coercive powers, to conceptualizing state capacity as a process of negotiated interdependence between regulators and societal organizations (Mann 1993,
Weiss 1998, Pedriana and Stryker 2004). This idea has been of greatest
interest to development scholars who have long puzzled over service delivery under conditions of weak state capacity, but it has not been applied to labor standards enforcement.
Pushing back against theoretically and practically rigid boundaries
between state, market, and civil society, Ostrom (1996) defined co-production as “the process through which inputs used to produce a good or
service are contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organization.”14 Ostrom argues that all public goods and services are not only
potentially produced by the regular producer—often government—but
also by those who are the consumer of the service—often referred to as
the client. The production of a service is frequently difficult to carry out
without the active participation of the client.15 Drawing upon case studies of water, sanitation and education systems in Brazil and Nigeria,
Ostrom found that incentivizing citizen participation in the design and
maintenance of urban infrastructural development projects made the
efforts of public officials more efficacious and contributed to higher levels of welfare. Strikingly, Ostrom found that these co-production projects were most likely to succeed if they were formalized with clear and
enforceable contracts.16
Building upon Ostrom’s co-production proposals, Joshi and Moore
(J&M 2004) argued that privatization and contracting out’s failure to
effectively deliver public services indicated a new model could be discerned. This model would have a “preferential shift away from standardized (central) state provision toward recognition of, and sympathy
for . . . diversity, experimentation and multi-actor arrangements.”17
J&M described institutionalized co-production as “the provision of public services (broadly defined to include regulation) through a regular,
long-term relationship between state agencies and organized groups of

14
15
16
17

Ostrom, supra note 13, at 1073.
Id.
Id. at 1082.
Joshi & Moore, supra note 13, at 32.
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citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions.” 18 In contrast to Ostrom’s requirement of formality, J&M argued that institutionalized co-production could be contractual or non-contractual and informal and that it could be renegotiated almost continuously as long as
it was of a long-term nature.19
Ostrom, J&M and other scholars mostly studied co-production in
the context of public service delivery and advanced it as a strategy in
countries where state authority is weak. However, co-production can
also be a useful way of thinking about labor standards enforcement, and
not only in countries where state authority is weak, but also where it is
strong but inspection capacity and trust in government is weak.
In addition to the co-production literature, this proposal builds
upon the concept of republican tripartism advanced by Ayres and
Braithwaite (A&B) and further developed by Fine and Gordon in the
labor standards enforcement literature. Seeking to take full advantage
of the gains that accrue from repeat encounters and cooperation over
time between regulators and firms while avoiding the heightened risk
of capture and corruption of the regulator by the firm that close cooperation engenders, A&B advocate for a regulatory process that provides
for the full and equal participation of a public interest group (PIG) in
enforcement.20 Like Ostrom, A&B’s PIG plays a formal and ongoing role
in enforcement and is granted full access to all information available to
the regulator, a seat at the table when the firm and agency are negotiating, and the same standing to sue or prosecute under the regulatory
statute as the regulator.21 The presence of empowered PIGs radically
limits the firm’s ability to capture the regulator because it now must
capture the PIGs as well as the agency officials.22 Additionally, PIGs
prevent capture and corruption by enforcing a meta-norm of punishing
regulators who fail to punish noncompliance.23 A&B argue that where
there is no power base and no information base for the weaker party,

18
19
20
21
22

Id. at 40.
See generally id.
See generally Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13.
Id.
Ostrom makes a similar argument:

If the remedy to corruption is seen as the creation of strict bureaucratic structure to
separate the servants of the public from the public, it is likely that behind the closed
doors of a centralized system corrupt practices can flourish without much fear of exposure. . . . When public officials and the citizens they are supposed to serve work together . . . productivity can be higher and all forms of opportunistic behavior are more
likely to be exposed, but never totally eliminated.
Ostrom, supra note 13, at 1083.
23
See generally Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13.
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tripartism will not work.24 To play their role effectively, PIG’s must receive public funding.25
Finally, these ideas about the critical relational and process dimensions of co-enforcement draw upon some collaborative governance (CG)
ideas.26 More than either co-production or tripartism, CG focuses on the
actual processes through which public agencies work with non-state
stakeholders to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets. CG emphasizes decision-making processes that are formal, consensus-oriented and deliberative. In contradistinction to tripartism, where one PIG is selected to play a role or corporatism and peak
bargaining takes place between the state and peak associations of labor
and capital,27 CG includes a broader range of stakeholders who seldom
have a representative monopoly over their sectors.28
II. THE FOUR DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF CO-ENFORCEMENT
A.

Principle #1: Recognize and Leverage the Unique,
Non-substitutable Capabilities of State and Society

At first glance, studying co-enforcement appears to be an exercise
in mapping out ways in which worker organizations and state regulators have an additive effect. Worker organizations might improve enforcement, for example, by providing in kind support to inspectors in
the form of transportation. In these circumstances, enforcement itself
is not materially changed, just augmented. Such inputs are important,
but they are largely “substitutable.”29 When regulators could provide
the exact same “inputs” as worker organizations, better strategies or
more generous budgets to enforcement agencies could simply substitute
for collaboration with worker organizations and increase “outputs.” If
this were only the case, co-enforcement is helpful, but not necessary. In
addition, if this were the case, we could maintain a theory of enforcement that separates the actions of labor inspectors from that of worker
organizations without obscuring key elements of the regulatory process.

24

Id.
Id.
26
See, e.g., Chris Ansell & Alison Gash, Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice, 18
J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 547 (2008).
27
Philippe C. Schmitter, Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability in Contemporary
Western Europe and North America, in ORGANIZING INTEREST IN WESTERN EUROPE: PLURALISM,
CORPORATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICS (Suzanne Berger ed., 1981).
28
Ansell & Gash, supra note 26, at 547.
29
See generally Ostrom, supra note 13.
25
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This research finds that workers, worker organizations, and regulators have capabilities that cannot be perfectly substituted for one another, or could perhaps be partially substitutable at great cost.30 Additionally as elaborated further below, some of the attributes of state and
society are non-substitutable because of trust and power.
One must therefore ask: What capabilities do workers, worker organizations and states possess that the others either do not share or
share only partially at great cost? Enforcement begins with workers on
the “shop floor”: what they see, hear, and experience firsthand, and
most critically, what they are willing to share, are instrumental to the
ability of workers’ organizations and the state to identifying non-compliance with labor standards. Workers have unique capabilities to enhance enforcement because they are present at the worksite every day,
have tacit knowledge31 of the work process and firsthand experience
with changes in working conditions and employer practices over time.
They also are steeped in the culture of the workplace and have relationships with other workers and supervisors. In the absence of “police patrol” enforcement, in which investigators would be regularly walking
their workplace beats, if any actor is poised to engage in the “fire alarm”
model of enforcement contemplated by the political scientists
McCubbins and Schwartz in the context of congressional oversight, it is
workers at the workplace.32
Certainly, worker knowledge could be at least partially substituted
by having a full-time investigator in every workplace at all times, but
this is costly and politically unfeasible. Additionally, our conception of
worker participation in enforcement is that multiple workers would
take part, geometrically increasing the chance that non-compliance
would be found out, as opposed to having one investigator with responsibility for monitoring an entire workplace. Worker participation is also
important for keeping worker organizational engagement in enforcement dynamic, bottom-up, and accountable. Finally, as Ostrom argues,
given the higher cost of labor of public officials in comparison with the
opportunity costs of workers spending some of their time engaged in

30

There are limits on what states can do on their own. The political scientist Joel Migdal
cogently argued, “No matter how vaunted the bureaucracy, police, and military, officers of the
state cannot stand on every corner ensuring that each person stop at the red light, drive on the
right side of the road, cross at the crosswalk, refrain from stealing and drug dealing, and so on.
Modern state leaders could easily find their institutions quickly overwhelmed by the enormity of
the task of enforcement, even with vast bureaucracies.” JOEL S. MIGDAL, STATE IN SOCIETY:
STUDYING HOW STATES AND SOCIETIES TRANSFORM AND CONSTITUTE ONE ANOTHER 252 (2001).
31
See generally MICHAEL POLANYI, THE TACIT DIMENSION (1966).
32
Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165–79 (1984).
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enforcement, the optimal arrangement is to have the enforcement output produced by some combination of inputs from both parties.
Flowing from what we have stated above, one of the most commonly
cited capabilities that worker organizations have is access to vast
amounts of information on labor standards that would be difficult for
state officials to gather alone.33 It is often only when the organization
has vouched for the agency and worked with workers over time that
vulnerable workers have been willing to file complaints with a full description of what has been occurring. Through relationships of trust between workers and organizations, investigators are able to gain access
to the knowledge and information workers possess about violations.
Worker organizations can play a critical role in monitoring and enforcement when they are place-based, relational, tutelary, participatory, activist and strategic. By place-based, we mean grounded in specific geographic communities; by relational, we mean they focus on
building relationships with and between workers, bringing groups of
workers together and building bridges between groups of workers and
the larger community;34 by tutelary, we mean the ability to teach workers about their rights and how to assert them, and to teach investigators
about the workforce and the industry; by participatory we mean they
have workers actively engaged in the life of the organization; by activist, we mean they have a belief in the need to re-govern the market
toward social ends and an orientation toward action; by strategic we
mean that they have knowledge of their sectors, laws and regulations,
how to work with government, and make the choice to focus some of
their resources on enforcement work.
Organizations with these capacities can acquire and pass along to
investigators, through workers as well as their own research, specialized knowledge of industry structures and the range of sub-contracting
arrangements and employment practices, as well as information on employers who are not complying with wage and hour and occupational
safety and health laws. When worker organizations understand how industries function, they are able to trace the root causes of violations,
which makes them powerful sources of expertise for inspectors who seldom specialize in a specific sector. This understanding also allows

33

See Matthew Amengual, Pathways to Enforcement: Labor Inspectors Leveraging Linkages
with Society in Argentina, 67 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3 (2014); Fine & Gordon, supra note 13;
Janice Fine, Solving the Problem from Hell: Tripartism as a Strategy for Addressing Labour Standards Non-Compliance in the US, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 813–44 (2014); Tess Hardy, Enrolling
Non-State Actors to Improve Compliance with Minimum Employment Standards, 22 ECON. & LAB
REL. REV. 117 (2011).
34
MARK R. WARREN, DRY BONES RATTLING: COMMUNITY BUILDING TO REVITALIZE AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (Princeton Univ. Press 2001).
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worker organizations to anticipate which sectors in the economy are
likely to become hotspots.35 They can help gather information about
firm practices, and through their relationships, networks and reputational credibility, encourage workers to file complaints with state and
federal agencies.
Worker organizations can also enhance the power of regulators in
responding to, and preventing, violations in several ways. Beneath the
veneer of neutral application of law, the street-level bureaucrats of regulatory agencies face a wide range of political pressures.36 While organizational structures, such as civil service protection, can reduce such
pressures, they can never be fully eliminated. Worker organizations can
play an important role by acting as a countervailing power to employers
during enforcement operations. For example, union leaders can push
regulators to negotiate terms of compliance that are more favorable to
employees. Finally, after the act of enforcement, the power of regulators
is dimmed by the low probability of a repeat enforcement action. When
labor inspectors move on to other firms or industries, worker organizations can continue to press employers to respect regulations.
To reiterate and build upon our earlier points, as in the case of
worker participation, some of the activities of organizations could be
substitutable by the state, but only at great cost and likely with inferior
results. But it is also clear that some of the attributes of worker organizations are non-substitutable because of trust and power. Organizations have the trust of vulnerable workers that state agencies often
lack. Worker organizations that are deeply rooted in their racial and
ethnic, linguistic, geographic, sectoral, cultural or political communities
are able to gain the trust of marginalized or undocumented workers who
are often reticent to complain directly to government.37 Of course the
nature of the collaboration between the organization and the state is of
critical importance to retaining workers’ trust. The organization must
avoid becoming simply an arm of the state; it must preserve its independence and demonstrate its commitment first and foremost to respecting the will of the workers. Once we admit that the enforcement
process is always at least somewhat politicized and that there are limits

35

For a detailed discussion of the ways in which worker centers and unions can enhance enforcement efforts, see Fine, supra note 33.
36
JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL
BASIS OF POLITICS (1989); MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE (2d ed. 2010); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989).
37
See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem
of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 2 (2005).
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to the degree that bureaucratic norms can constrain street level bureaucrats from exercising their own discretion, the inclusion of worker organizations can bring in power to support enforcement that cannot be
given to the state no matter how many resources are available to it.
They also have power to compel changes in firm behavior that the state
does not always have or choose to exercise; that is, organizations exercise moral power38 when they document and publicize egregious examples and patterns of exploitation and abuse, and hold specific employers
responsible for them publicly. Fearing such reputational repercussions,
some businesses respond to this pressure.
State regulators, of course, also have unique capabilities and independent powers.39 The power of the state to legally enforce depends
upon fundamental attributes as the monopoly holder of coercive powers
that can be used to induce compliance that worker organizations lack.
The state has the independent power to set standards, to incentivize
behavior and to compel firms to undertake improvements. State regulators have the power to demand information, to investigate workplaces
through on-site inspections of facilities and payroll records and to punish through the use of fines, suspensions, denial of licenses and closing
down firms. Inspectors know the complexities of the laws they are enforcing and the procedures necessary to putting strong cases together.
The state has the ability to empower societal groups by delegating to
them certain rights and privileges.40 State regulators also have the capability, both operationally and politically, to enforce regulations where
worker organizations are absent or weak. This capability is crucial because there will always be places and industries without strong worker
organizations. Finally, by targeting sectors, citing employers, and publicizing their enforcement actions, the state also has the unique power
of legitimation41 of the claims of workers and worker organizations to
the broader society.

38

JENNIFER JIHYE CHUN, ORGANIZING AT THE MARGINS: THE SYMBOLIC POLITICS OF LABOR IN
SOUTH KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES (2009); JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING
COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006); JAMES M. JASPER, THE ART OF MORAL PROTEST:
CULTURE, BIOGRAPHY, AND CREATIVITY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1997); GENE SHARP, GANDHI
WIELDS THE WEAPON OF MORAL POWER (THREE CASE STORIES) (1960).
39
We agree with the institutional analytical approach that posits an independent role for political institutions and takes into account both the efficacy of institutional design and, as March
and Olsen argue: “Bureaucratic agencies, legislative committees, and appellate courts are arenas
for contending social forces, but they are also collections of standard operating procedures and
structures that define and defend values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs.” MARCH &
OLSEN, supra note 36, at 16–19 (1989); BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN (Peter B. Evans et al. eds.,
1985).
40
Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13; Fine & Gordon supra note 13.
41
JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005).
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In sum, this discussion suggests that to identify opportunities for
enhancing enforcement it is essential for all parties to recognize that
state regulators, workers, and worker organizations have non-substitutable capabilities. When this is the case, the full potential for enforcement cannot be achieved without including workers and worker organizations no matter how many resources are allocated to regulators.
B.

Principle #2: Routinize Flows of Information and Resources across
the State-Society Divide

What needs to flow across the state-society divide to make enforcement more effective? The analysis above suggests some starting points.
To begin, regulators need to have access to information that worker organizations can provide at a granular level. Information-sharing was
not emphasized by Ostrom or J&M, but it was of major import for Ayres
and Braithwaite and it comes up repeatedly as an issue for organizations in our case studies of co-enforcement in labor standards enforcement. Worker organizations that are actively bringing workers forward
need to know not only what the regulatory agency is capable of doing
and how it functions (more on this below) but also to be kept abreast of
how cases are proceeding. When organizations facilitate complaints,
but are not able to get information on how the case is proceeding, their
credibility with the workers they have encouraged to step forward is
undermined.42 After this happens repeatedly, organizations can begin
to view filing complaints with the state as a last resort.
Resources can also be key to extending the operational capabilities
of both states and worker organizations. Worker organizations can provide inspectors with material resources, such as staff who go out to
worksites, can interview workers and help them to fill out complaints,
and can reconstruct payroll records for use by investigators. These resources can make a tremendous difference for labor inspectorates that
have large caseloads and lack sufficient budgets. Most sectors of the low
wage economy are not represented by strong unions that can fight for
enforcement resources. When resources flow from the state to society,
however, regulatory partnerships can be used to strengthen the ability
of worker organizations to support enforcement. Reinforcing worker organizations can also occur when the state devolves certain activities to
worker organizations by providing the organizations with access that
can help them gain and maintain members.

42

Interview with Jennifer Rosenbaum, Legal and Policy Director, National Guest Workers
Alliance (July 26, 2013).
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Principle #3: Prioritization of the Relationship, Clear
Communication and Decision-Making Processes and Modulation
of Demands

Fundamentally, the success of co-enforcement depends upon strong
relationships between the state agency and workers, worker organizations and high road firms.43 Trust, adaptation, accountability and communication are key to these relationships. At the outset, as Ansell and
Gash emphasized, it is critical for the parties to recognize the “starting
conditions” of the collaboration including power differentials, what incentives to participation exist or do not exist, and whatever has gone
before that has either created antagonism or paved the way toward cooperation.44 In our research, organizational leaders seldom completely
shared their true feelings about agency behavior directly with the specific agencies and vice versa. Additionally, they emphasized the necessity of collaboration and sharing as much information as quickly as possible, but did not indicate to the agencies that knowing the status of the
case as it progressed was essential to their ability to maintain credibility with workers and continue to expand cases. Government agencies
emphasized that organizations need to understand and adapt to the
pressures and constraints government must operate within, and have
the capacity to add real value to investigations. But these agencies did
not always say this directly to the groups. One veteran official emphasized the importance of choosing the right organization. The most effective partnerships were with organizations that, to paraphrase what
many agency leaders said enforce in firms even though enforcement will
not directly benefit members of the organization, “understood that
when you are partnering with government, you have to work within the
confines of government, not that government has to work within the
broader confines of your organization.”45
In their review of the literature, Ansell and Gash find that in rare
cases negotiations take place organically without assistance, but that
collaborative governance has not been possible in most cases without
facilitative leaders on both sides who bring stakeholders together, set
and maintain clear ground rules, build trust, facilitate dialogue, explore
mutual gains, and work together in a collaborative spirit.46 Facilitative
leaders, who have the skills to promote broad and active participation,

43

DARA O’ROURKE, COMMUNITY DRIVEN REGULATION: BALANCING DEVELOPMENT AND THE
ENVIRONMENT IN VIETNAM 225 (2004).
44
Ansell & Gash, supra note 26, at 550.
45
Interview with Anonymous Agency Official.
46
Id. at 554.
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productive group dynamics, and the process are especially important
when the starting conditions are sub-optimal—such as when the incentives for participation are weak, power and resources are asymmetrically distributed or prior antagonisms between the actors are high.
Whereas leaders are often understood as those capable of taking decisive action, Ansell and Gash argue that the leadership focus of the collaborative leader is on promoting, safeguarding and stewarding the process.
D. Principle #4: Political Support to Create and Maintain
Collaboration
Political support for enforcement agencies is crucial because business interests frequently push back against regulation and attempt to
discredit regulators. Unions in the U.S. have long mobilized to defend
the programs and budgets of labor standards enforcement agencies. As
we elaborate below, coproduced enforcement requires additional support in the US because it is not seen as the norm. Therefore, there must
be willingness and capacity among multiple actors to advocate for the
partnerships.
Co-enforcement requires ongoing external and internal political
support. Partnerships do not form just because they can enhance the
abilities of regulators and worker organizations to fulfill their stated
goals. Instead, there needs to be a political willingness among multiple
actors who advocate for partnerships and for funding of partnerships.
Political support is crucial because as regulators and worker organizations collaborate in the process of enforcement, they necessarily cede
some control over tasks that are key to their organizations. For instance, the degree to which regulators accept cases from worker organizations may reduce the ability of regulators to select and craft cases in
ways that comply with formal organizational objectives, as well as the
broader goals of the regulatory agency. Regulators also face the risk of
being branded as acting in the interest of worker organizations instead
of the public good. In addition, giving worker organizations access to
the state can further their own organizational prerogatives, thus
strengthening them in the medium to long term. This possibility makes
collaborations especially politically sensitive. Similarly, worker organizations need to see it in their own organizational interest to invest time
and resources into the enforcement process. Sometimes this means
waiting for the slow moving regulatory system. It also may mean taking
a step back to allow the regulatory agency to enforce in firms even
though enforcement will not directly benefit members of the organization.
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To identify ways in which co-enforcement may enhance enforcement, it is necessary to analyze the relationships between state regulators and organizations of civil society. At one end of the spectrum, the
relationship can be formalized and worker organizations can be given
wide-ranging powers. Tripartism, as envisioned by Ayres and
Braithwaite, provides a specific public interest organization with a formal and ongoing role in enforcement and provides access to the same
information the regulator sees.47 Co-enforcement as envisioned by
Ostrom, also favors formalization.48
At the other end of the spectrum, relationships can be entirely informal. Organizations and government can be in frequent communication, meet together, share information, and strategize without creating
a structured agreement. Instrumental to informal partnerships are a
shared interest in their value and some common organizational culture
regarding collaboration, along with individual relationships between
bureaucrats and worker organizations which often involve active
boundary-spanning individuals49 who navigate both worlds of state regulators and worker organizations. These individuals do more than
simply communicate and share information between the parties: they
process information for both sides, using their discretion to act as gatekeepers and facilitate cooperation.50
The combinations of formal and informal attributes of these relationships have implications for the functioning of partnerships. Formal
arrangements create clear sets of rules and procedures to govern partnerships. Formal structures can also alleviate concern on the part of
state officials that close collaboration with civil society organizations
(without official structures) could lead to charges of cronyism or favoritism. And when formal structures guarantee certain status for worker
organizations, they can reduce concerns on the part of organizations
that their credibility with workers is damaged if they encourage them
to come forward but are then kept in the dark as to how their cases are
proceeding.51
47

See generally Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 13.
See generally Ostrom, supra note 13.
49
Boundary spanners are individuals who are able to communicate across organizational
boundaries because of their ability to learn local languages, coding schemes and specialized conceptual frameworks and are “attuned to the contextual information on both sides of the boundary . . . .” Michael L. Tushman & Thomas J. Scanlan, Boundary Spanning Individuals: Their Role
in Information Transfer and Their Antecedents, 24 ACAD. MGMT. J. 289, 291–92 (1981).
50
Howard Aldrich & Diane Herker, Boundary Spanning Roles and Organization Structure, 2
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217 (1977).
51
Aldrich and Herker also argue that formalization serves a social control function because
the programmed nature of the interactions is “partial insurance of boundary spanner consistency
with organizational procedures, norms and goals. Members who interact freely with non-member
48
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While politics will always play a role in determining which groups
can effectively partner with regulators, formal structures are important
for weaker groups in particular.52 CG scholars argue that if significant
power and resource imbalances between shareholders exist such that
some are unable to participate in a meaningful way, there must be a
commitment to a positive strategy of empowerment and representation
of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders or the project will not succeed.
Formal arrangements are likely to be more robust than those that
rely upon relationships between individuals at a specific political moment and thus are always contingent and temporary. Also, certainly in
the US, it is less likely that resources will be shared when arrangements are informal. Informal attributes of relationships differ in the
types of creation costs. On the one hand, they can fly under the radar
of partisan politics and fewer formal rules that can get in the way. This
reduces the need to go through formal veto players, such as legislatures.
On the other hand, informal relationships require time and investment
by individual officials and their societal counterparts to develop collaborative arrangements without the support of official mandates.
III. CO-ENFORCEMENT CASES
A.

The National Guestworkers Alliance (NGA) and the OSHA
Walk-Around

NGA was founded by the New Orleans Worker Center for Racial
Justice (NOWCRJ), an organization of African American and immigrant workers. It began during the post-Katrina clean-up and rebuilding phase during which thousands of immigrant workers were recruited
to come to New Orleans to aid in the massive clean-up. At the time,
although working conditions were particularly dangerous due to the
storm damage, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) was under a federal order to cease all enforcement actions and
engage only in “compliance assistance” activities. Workers could not file
complaints to have their workplaces investigated and OSHA was barred
from issuing complaints or fines against employers. Strikingly, while
the DOL was running on a skeletal staff, federal immigration agents
were engaging in aggressive enforcement efforts, further discouraging
groups, particularly homogenous sets, are likely to develop attitudes consistent with those of the
non-members, rather than of their focal organization. The existence of standard operating procedures partially protects the organization against attitudes and behaviors that are not consistent
with organizational objectives.” Aldrich and Herker, supra note 50, at 226.
52
This form of “stacking the deck” can facilitate co-enforcement and ensure access to the state
by particular groups. Jonathan Bendor et al., Stacking the Deck: Bureaucratic Missions and Policy
Design, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 873 (1987).
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workers from reporting unsafe conditions or wage theft.53 During this
period, the center was also contacted by guest workers charged thousands of dollars by recruiters and then subjected to terrible abuse at
luxury hotels damaged by the storm. Those who spoke up about the exploitative conditions were routinely threatened with deportation.
In the face of these challenges, the Worker Center and NGA did
pioneering work in calling attention to what was happening to the reconstruction workers, providing organizing assistance and expanding
the use of labor and immigration laws to support them. As local African
American workers and their families were displaced from their homes
and locked out of employment, and immigrant workers both documented and undocumented were locked into employment by unscrupulous recruiters and employers, the Worker Center and NGA’s signature
strategy was to foster relationships, solidarity and common purpose between local workers, undocumented immigrant workers, and guest
workers.54
In the spring of 2011, 400 students from countries including China,
Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Mongolia, Romania, Ghana and Thailand
were recruited at their universities to participate in the U.S. State Department’s J-1 summer cultural exchange visa program.55 Each of the
students paid between $3000 and $6000 to CETUSA, a State-department certified recruiter and its international affiliates.56 Under the J-1
program, work is supposed to be of secondary importance to educational
and cultural exchange, but the students got an education of a different
sort when they were forced to take up work as exploited, sub-minimum
wage factory workers.57 It was a classic joint employer58 case: the stu-

53

JJ Rosenbaum, Presentation at Rutgers Univ. Sch. of Mgmt. and Labor Rel. (Nov. 10, 2014);
Mike Hall, House Hearing on Katrina Shows Massive Wage Abuse by No-Bid Contractors, AFL
CIO NOWBLOG (June 26, 2007), http://www.mobilityagenda.org/katrina.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6
VP-7AEE].
54
Interview with Jacob Horwitz, Lead Organizer, NGA (July 23, 2013).
55
Julie Preston, Foreign Students in Work Visa Program Stage Walkout at Plant, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/us/18immig.html?pagewanted=all&_r
[https://perma.cc/8FUF-H3JH].
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
“Joint employer” is when two or more companies share the status of employer of a single
worker. The criteria that has been used to determine whether a joint employment situation exists
include: whether separate entities share or codetermine matters governing essential terms and
conditions of employment or employers meaningfully affect matters relating to the employment
relationship such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision and direction. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET #35: JOINT EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
(FLSA) AND MIGRANT AND SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROTECTION ACT (MSPA) (Jan.
2016), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs35.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Z5B-3HK2].
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dents were brought to work at Eastern Distribution Center III, in Palmyra, Pennsylvania which is owned by the Hershey Co. but operated by
Exel North American Logistics, a sizeable contract logistics provider
with more than five hundred facilities in the US and Canada, which in
turn contracted with SHS Staffing Solutions to bring in the foreign
workers. The plant was entirely staffed by these J-1 students who left
their countries during college breaks for three-month periods; it ran on
a three shift, twenty-four hour a day schedule.59 The students were put
to work packing Reese’s peanut butter cups, Kit-Kat bars and Hershey’s
Kisses for promotional displays under extremely unsafe conditions.60
Excessive assembly line speeds coupled with low staffing levels resulted
in high rates of neck, back and arm injuries from lifting and carrying
boxes, according to the OSHA joint employer complaint filed that summer by NGA on behalf of twelve named guest workers and over 400
similarly situated workers.61
NGA organizers and lawyers worked with the Department of Labor
to share the information they were gathering from the guest workers,
developing legal and policy strategies to remedy the situation.62 NGA
organizers went apartment to apartment, talking to students about
their living and working conditions, painstakingly constructing a picture of the complex supply chain relationships, documenting the problems students had experienced, teaching them about their labor and
employment rights and strategizing with them about how to build the
power it would take to win improvements.63 Together with NGA, students worked collectively to map and document the violations by multi-

59

See Preston, supra note 55.
Id.
61
The complaint charged Exel North American Logistics, Inc., SHS Onsite Solutions and Cultural Exchange Travel, USA (CETUSA) with failing their general duty to furnish their employees
“employment and place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees” as required by the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, as well as failure to keep records of injuries, as required by law. These
details are drawn from the August 17, 2011 OSHA complaint filed by the NGA on behalf of student
guestworkers against Exel North American Logistics, Inc., SHS Onsite Solutions and Cultural
Exchange Travel, USA (CETUSA). See Jennifer Rosenbaum, Request for Revocation of Sponsorship of Council for Educational Travel, USA (CETUSA) (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.guestworker
alliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/WEB.-State-Dept-Complaint-J-1-workers-8.17.2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BA5W-8BN3]; US Labor Department’s OSHA Cites 2 Companies, Proposes
$288,000 in Fines for Workplace Safety and Health Violations Involving Foreign Students, OSHA
(Feb. 13, 2012), https://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/osha/OSHA20120321.htm [https://perma.cc/
K6PA-8RS8]; Settlement Agreement, Solis v. Exel Inc., OSHRC (Dec. 31, 2012) (No. 12-0683),
https://www.osha.gov/enforcement/cwsa/exel-inc-12312012 [https://perma.cc/4DQ7-W6EM].
62
See Preston, supra note 55.
63
Id.
60
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ple entities under multiple legal regimes, and to build a strategy to expose and change conditions at the plant.64 The students eventually went
on strike to elevate their voice and press their demands for a serious
investigation of working conditions at the packing plant.65
The Department of Labor responded quickly by activating their
Wage and Hour investigators in the region. With the help of the NGA
organizers on the ground in Palmyra, who over their time had developed hundreds of contacts and the trust of many of the students, WHD
investigators were able to meet and interview students outside the
workplace and quickly open an investigation into their claims of mistreatment. “They really took a stance that dignified and empowered the
workers,” said Julie Mao, one of the lawyers working in Palmyra66 Their
collaboration with OSHA was a turning point in the campaign and
broke important new ground.
Recognizing the importance of employees being informed of government inspections and directly consulted about their experiences of
workplace hazards, congressional drafters wrote them into Section 8 of
the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act, giving representatives
authorized by employees the right to accompany Compliance Safety and
Health Officers (CSHO) on inspections.67 This “walk-around” rule
meant that OSHA inspectors, upon entering a facility, routinely asked
for the highest-ranking union official at the plant to accompany them.
At a time when they represented a third of the US workforce, the rule
was largely assumed to apply to labor unions in the plants under inspection,68 but more recently, the Field Operations Manual was
changed to broaden the definition of employee representative. It now
says:
an authorized representative of the employee bargaining unit
such as a certified or recognized labor organization, an attorney
acting for an employee or any other person acting in a bona fide
representative capacity including . . . members of the clergy, social workers, spouses and other family members, and government officials or nonprofit groups and organizations acting upon
specific complaints and injuries from individuals who are employees.69

64
65
66
67
68
69

Id.
Id.
Interview with Julie Mao (July 28, 2014).
S. REP. No. 91-1282 (1970).
Interview with Deborah Berkowitz (Mar. 7, 2014).
DAVID MICHAELS, OSHA INSTRUCTION, CPL-02-00-160, FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, (Aug.
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In practice however, unions and community organizations representing
non-union employees had only rarely been granted the right to participate in walk-arounds.
In the complaint filed on behalf of the J-1 students, NGA requested
permission for three students and NGA’s legal director to participate as
the employees’ representative in the OSHA walk-around.70 For the first
time, OSHA granted the request.
A narrow interpretation of the type of organization that was entitled to participate on a walk-around was embraced under the Bush administration in a 2003 opinion in response to a query from the Boilermakers Union. At that time, OSHA’s interpretation of Section 8 was
that a union representative who had filed a complaint on behalf of a
worker in a non-union facility did not have a right to accompany an
OSHA CSHO on the inspection walk-around.71 Nevertheless, the
NOWCRJ and NGA had applied several times to be the walk-around
rep for workers it was working with. In 2011, in response to a query
filed by the Health and Safety specialist at the United Steel Workers of
America, OSHA arrived at a different interpretation, one that said that
the Act provided that one or more workers could in fact “designate a
person affiliated with a union or a community organization to act on
their behalf as a walk-around representative” and that representative
did not have to be a coworker.72
Although Hershey opposed it, and Exel Inc. threatened to refuse
the inspection, in the end OSHA designated Rosenbaum and three student workers as walk-around representatives. Recounting how they began the inspection that day, Godwin Efobi, a medical student who was
one of the walk-around representatives recalled how encouraging the
agency investigators were that day, “OSHA told us ‘if you know those
places where students usually have injuries, we want you to point them
out to us. You are protected by us.’”73 Don’t worry if there is anything
that is happening that isn’t the way it used to be. Just go on the floor

2, 2016), https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_02-00-160.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XHJ5ERL].
70
OSHA, supra note 61.
71
John L. Henshaw, OSHA Interpretation of 1903.8 Letter to Milan Racic, Health and Safety
Specialist of the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, OSHA (Mar. 7, 2003), https://
www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=24459
[https://perma.cc/2YY4-946A].
72
Richard E. Fairfax, OSHA Interpretation Letter Regarding Standards 1903.8, 1903.11,
1952.10 and 1903.20 to Steve Salman, Health and Safety Specialist, United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers Union, OSHA (Feb.
21, 2013), https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETAT
IONS&p_id=28604 [https://perma.cc/F6XY-WVTJ].
73
Interview with Goodwin Efobi, OSHA Walk-around Rep. (July 28, 2014).
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and if you see something different just come to us and point it out.’”74
From Rosenbaum’s perspective, the agency’s findings were more accurate as a result of the students’ participation in the walk-around because OSHA got “real-time” information from the students about priority areas for inspection and what had been changed in the plant prior
to the inspection.75 Efobi recalled that:
the first noticeable thing was the Exel Inc. staff, they were the
ones supervising us. They were very courteous, it was like surreal . . . and then more significantly, the pace of the lines was
almost like in slow motion or something like that. . . . The pace
of work was something people could work at because it was normally so much faster.76
As the group walked through the plant they were a visual affirmation
that the students’ plight had been noted and that action was being
taken; workers were relaxed and smiling, flashing thumbs up signs.
In describing the significance of student participation in the walkaround, Efobi said, “We felt it was a victory. . . . It was satisfying to
come in there with the full weight of the law behind us.”77 From Rosenbaum’s perspective, worker participation in the walk-around is a gamechanging intervention because it levels the playing field.78 Most low
wage immigrant workers find themselves at a significant power disadvantage vis-a-vis their employers.
Typically, your employer controls everything about the physical
space, being able to bring the government in shows a shift in
power that is visible to everyone in the plant. Filing a complaint
isn’t visible, OSHA coming in by itself doesn’t change that in a
transparent way, but if the worker is walking around with the
investigator, giving her side of the story along with the employer, it just feels so fair, because government is in the middle
and you both get to tell your side of the story.79
Rosenbaum also emphasized that workers often have supply chain information critical to joint employer investigations which the employer
may resist providing.80
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id.
Interview with JJ Rosenbaum, Nat’l Guest Workers Alliance (July 28–31, 2014).
Efobi, supra note 73.
Id.
Rosenbaum, supra note 75.
Id.
Id.
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Despite her enthusiasm for expanded use of the new walk-around
policy, Rosenbaum made it clear that it was important that workers’
centers adopt a flexible approach to how to work with OSHA in investigations. “The critical point is that the investigative procedure makes
sure OSHA is getting the information it needs from workers and employers in an uncoerced way.”81 Top officials at OSHA who were interviewed for this study concurred, saying that from their perspective, the
walk-around is not always the most critical component of an investigation for organizations to be involved in. From their perspective, workers
do not always feel comfortable speaking their mind to investigators during walk-arounds, so having worker centers participate in getting
worker interviews offsite is often of greater value.82
After a six-month investigation that culminated with the walkaround, Exel was cited for nine violations, including six willful workplace
safety and health violations at the Eastern Distribution Center III, with
proposed penalties totaling $283,000.83 Exel was cited for failing to record injuries and illnesses as required by law including forty-two serious
injuries that had occurred over the past four years at the plant. OSHA
also cited SHS Staffing Solutions for one serious violation:84 failing to
provide training to employees on the lockout/tagout of energy sources,
with a proposed penalty of $5000. CETUSA’s designation as a J-1 visa
program sponsor was also terminated. In addition, the WHD found violations of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of FLSA due to
excessive housing cost deductions and imposed additional civil monetary penalties for repeat violations. As part of a joint settlement on the
wage and hour violations with Exel, SHS, and CETUSA, Exel had to
agree to implement a voluntary corporate-wide compliance program to
review each of its facilities for FLSA and OSHA compliance, to provide
training for managers and supervisors regarding FLSA and OSHA requirements, to establish a hearing conservation program, eliminate incentive programs based on the number of reports of work-related injuries or illnesses, to hire a qualified safety consultant and to create a
permanent position within the company with authority for overseeing
this work.
In making the judgment to include NGA and the students in the
walk-around in Palmyra, OSHA recognized the unique role each was

81

Id.
Interview with Deborah Berkowitz (Aug. 14, 2014).
83
Willful violations are those committed with intentional knowledge or voluntary disregard
for the law’s requirements, or with plain indifference to worker safety and health.
84
A serious violation occurs when there is substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a hazard about which the employer knew or should know.
82
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playing in identifying safety problems and bolstering the hundreds of
student guest workers to come forward with the facts of the case, despite their fear of being blacklisted and deported. OSHA valued the relationship and in the face of strong organizing by NGA, the agency took
the political risk to include the organization and the students in the
walk-around. NGA prioritized partnering with government on enforcement. OSHA is in the process of drafting changes to its Field Operations
Manual that should include the new walk-around interpretation and
administrative language that encourages more widespread inclusion of
worker organizations in investigations. In November of 2014, NGA’s
Legal Director was appointed as a labor representative to the Whistleblower Advisory Committee—a recognition of the expertise residing in
worker centers in developing effective whistleblower and anti-retaliation policies within OSHA.85
Worker and worker center participation in the walk-around must
be understood as one tactic in a larger strategy of engagement with
health and safety issues that can empower workers to organize and improve conditions at the enterprise-wide level and to drive change
throughout their supply chains. In fact, walk-around rights for workers,
unions and worker centers in non-union settings are part of a larger set
of strategies pioneered by Eric Frumin, Health and Safety Director for
Change to Win, the late Tony Mazzochi of the Oil Chemical and Atomic
Workers Union, Peg Seminario, the AFL-CIO Health and Safety Director and other individuals and unions within the labor movement who
have long utilized health and safety as an organizing tool in non-union
workplaces. For example, it was during the campaign to organize J.P.
Stevens in 1979, that the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union (ACTWU) first established the right of non-union workers to
choose unions to represent them under OSHA. ACTWU, the Steelworkers, the United Farm Workers, UNITE HERE, SEIU, the Teamsters
and most recently, UFCW in its Our Walmart campaign, have all engaged in organizing campaigns in which health and safety issues figured prominently as a tool to build worker power and call the public’s
attention to unsafe working conditions. In all of these cases unions represented non-union workers, despite not being the bargaining agent, in
filing complaints and getting citations.86 The other advantage to OSHA
as an organizing tool is that workers who go on strike to protest workplace hazards are protected for work refusals and for concerted activity.

85

Secretary of Labor Announces New Members of the Whistleblower Protection Advisory Committee, OSHA (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/trade/10202014 [https://
perma.cc/67Z3-FE42].
86
Interviews with Eric Frumin (Apr. 3, 16, 2014 & June 4, 5, 16, 2014).
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Given the increase in worker centers engaging in health and safety
work and being supported through the Susan Harwood program at
OSHA, there is a ripe opportunity for deeper collaboration between
worker centers and unions on the linkages between enforcement and
organizing in health and safety. It is essential that there be mutual
learning and sharing of innovative practices developed by unions over
many years in health and safety organizing with worker centers and
other “alt-labor” groups. Through the AFL-CIO, Change to Win, COSH
and other networks, Seminario, Frumin and others have been sharing
this history and knowledge with the worker center movement but there
is a need to develop deeper, more deliberate opportunities for reaching
and training new generations of health and safety researchers and organizers.87
B.

The Los Angeles Black Worker Center Community Compliance
and Monitoring Project

The L.A. Black Worker Center (LABWC) was founded in 2010 to
build organized power and grassroots leadership among Black workers
and the extended community to reverse disproportionate levels of unemployment and underemployment which stand at a staggering 50% in
the Los Angeles Black community.88 The organization’s goals are to increase access to quality careers, address employment discrimination
and improve conditions in industries that employ Black workers in L.A.
LABWC has targeted the construction sector because it provides access
to real careers and cannot be outsourced, but has had a history of excluding Blacks.89 In the early 1990’s, Waldinger and Bailey found that
reliance by the construction unions, and the industry as a whole, on
informal social networks for both recruitment and training have made
it difficult for African American workers to break into construction.90 In
Los Angeles, only 4.9% of construction workers are Black, despite comprising 9% of the population. As Will Scott, Joint Apprenticeship Coordinator of Sheetmetal Workers Local 105 put it “In my career which
87

Eric Frumin, et al., Health and Safety Tools in Organizing Campaigns, Presentation at the
National Council for Occupational Safety and Health Training (Dec. 6–7, 2012).
88
For the groundbreaking study that catalyzed the founding of the LA Black Worker Center,
see Steven C. Pitts, Job Quality and Black Workers: An Examination of the San Francisco Bay
Area, Los Angeles, Chicago and New York, UC Berkeley Center for Labor Res. and Educ. (2d
ed.2007), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2007/blackworkers_07.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD43TV43].
89
Thomas J. Sugrue, Affirmative Action from Below: Civil Rights, the Building Trades, and
the Politics of Racial Equality in the Urban North, 1945-1969, 91 J. AM. HIST. 143–73 (2004); Roger
Waldinger & Thomas Bailey, The Continuing Significance of Race: Racial Conflict and Racial Discrimination in Construction, 19 POL. & SOC’Y 291–323 (1991).
90
Waldinger & Bailey, supra note 89, at 293.
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spans now twenty-four years, it was very unlikely to find other black
workers on these construction sites.” Scott also described the effects of
the racially exclusive culture:
There were very few and if you did see other black workers you
were almost cautious not to draw yourself to them . . . There was
fear of . . . your reputation. You didn’t want to be seen as gathering or slacking by being sociable on the jobsite with other
blacks . . . .91
LABWC’s beginning strategy for opening up construction has been to
focus on diversifying the enormous public sector projects that are underway in the City and County.
The organization has its roots in the groundbreaking work of the
UC Berkeley and Los Angeles Labor Centers as well as the Los Angeles
Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE). In 2012 it was a leading participant in a labor/community coalition that won the first metropolitan
transit authority Project Labor Agreement (PLA) with national targeted hiring goals for federally-funded, Federal Transit Administration
approved projects in the nation. It is mammoth—covering $70 billion
worth of projects and projected to create more than 270,000 jobs. Financing comes partially through Measure R, the half-cent sales tax that
was approved by LA County voters in 2008 and partially through federal funding from the Federal Transit Administration, which requires
national targeted hiring goals.92 In addition to federal affirmative action requirements, the LA County Metropolitan Transit Authority also
adopted a Construction Careers Policy intended to encourage construction and employment and training opportunities “in ways calculated to
mitigate the harms caused by geographically concentrated poverty, unemployment and underemployment . . . .”93
As the debate on the PLA unfolded, the LABWC focused on “creating a climate for this issue of black workers to be prioritized,” said Lola
Smallwood Cuevas, Executive Director of the LABWC. “We mobilized
out-of-work black construction workers to come out and testify about
why they needed to be a part of it and how the Metro board could help
make a change,” she continued. As a result of their work, including the
establishment of a Black Labor Construction Council made up of Black

91

Interview with Will Scott (Dec. 4, 2014).
Executive Order 11246 requires affirmative action hiring for minorities and women on all
federally funded projects. Exec. Order No. 11,264, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319, 12,935 (Sept. 24, 1965).
93
L.A. CTY. METRO. TRANSP. ADMIN., PROJECT LABOR AGREEMENT, http://media.metro.net/
about_us/pla/images/Project_Labor_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L84-WY9H].
92
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construction workers, and the alliances they forged with elected officials, and the local Sheet Metal, IBEW and Painters unions, the resulting PLA included a 10% “disadvantaged worker” component.94 Adopted
unanimously, LABWC believed that the organization needed to set its
sights on robust implementation. “We did not call it a victory when we
were able to see this adopted,” said Smallwood Cuevas, “because we felt
enforcement was the key.”
The LABWC’s goal is to double the representation of Black construction workers on transit projects, particularly those that align with
predominantly Black neighborhoods. Since construction commenced on
the $2.058 billion Crenshaw/LAX Transportation Project in early 2014,
LABWC has been developing strategies strengthening the pipeline of
Black workers into construction, providing ongoing support to ensure
success and monitoring the numbers of workers hired and employed on
the jobsite and their experiences on the job. “We expect these worksites
to look like the census tracks they are working in. We started with the
Crenshaw line, because if we can’t do it in Crenshaw, where can we do
it?” said Smallwood Cuevas. The organization’s benchmark for success
on the Crenshaw project is 25% Black, 5% female and 20% apprentice
participation. It has been extremely focused on how to monitor and enforce the terms of the PLA.
The LABWC created the Community Compliance and Monitoring
Program to ensure that Metro, the contractor (Walsh-Shea), any subcontractors, and the unions comply with the spirit of the PLA, which is
intended to tackle the barriers that have kept Blacks and women out of
the trades. “We are doing grassroots monitoring and enforcement of the
agreement because a lot of enforcement has been dismantled,” said
Smallwood Cuevas. “Unions have so many things they are ensuring—
workers in the right classifications and trust funds being paid into. Who
will prioritize exclusion? Diversity often comes down low on the list of
things that folks are actually monitoring and enforcing and tracking,”
she observed. “We want to understand what are those policies that help
us ramp up enforcement. What are the tools that help us combat the
notion that we don’t have the political will to enforce civil rights laws in
the U.S?” In the first phase of the project, the organization developed a
94

Prevented by the passage of Proposition 209 from setting explicit racial targets, the disadvantaged worker language is defined to mean someone who resides in an economically disadvantaged or extremely economically disadvantaged area and faces at least two of the following barriers
to employment: 1) homelessness; 2) being a custodial single parent; 3) receiving public assistance;
4) lacking a GED or high school diploma; 5) having a criminal record or other involvement with
the criminal justice system; 6) suffering from chronic unemployment; 7) emancipated from the
foster care system; 8) being a veteran of the Iraq/Afghanistan war or 9) being an apprentice with
less than 15% of the hours required to graduate to journey level Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit
Authority and Los Angeles. Id.
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report card tool for researching, evaluating and grading contractors bidding on the Crenshaw work based on previous adherence to equity,
transparency and accountability and then moved on to the hiring process and outcomes.
The PLA requires the contractor to hire a Jobs Coordinator whose
job is to facilitate implementation of the Targeted Hiring Requirements.95 Metro releases a monthly Targeted Worker Report, but it is
based on self-report data from contractors. Working with researchers
from the University of Southern California, the organization developed
a Community Compliance Monitoring Toolkit that laid out a methodology for carrying out their own oversight, generating their own numbers
and then comparing it to the Metro Targeted Worker Reports.96 Additionally, given the length and depth of the problem of Black employment in the trades, the organization pushed for the establishment of an
oversight table that is regularly bringing Metro, contractors, elected officials, EEOC representatives and City agencies together to review the
recruitment and retention numbers, consider strategies for raising
them, and probe the issues that affect Black workers on the worksite,
in real time.97 “Through conversations with our members we have been
identifying what is needed . . . from day one the subcontractors need to
know the policy and we need to be in the pre-jobs meetings, showing
them how discrimination happens,” said Smallwood Cuevas. “If workers have to solicit their work, they can contact the primary or the subcontractor, but we need to know whether their information is being
taken or whether they are being turned away . . . or why people are
being jumped on the hiring list . . .” she said. The Black Labor Construction Council gives them a unique capacity to flag these issues. From
Metro’s perspective, LABWC brings unique capacities to the monitoring
and enforcement process. “They are right in the middle of the Crenshaw
95

The Jobs Coordinator always works for the contractor, not for Metro. On the Crenshaw/LAX
project, that position is held by PV Jobs which is responsible for: generating and maintaining specific programs targeting residents for construction opportunities at the project, attending jobs fairs
and/or community meetings to outreach to the community regarding opportunities available for
the union, provide assistance to clients for entry into the unions, generate and maintain program
specific documentation for the project’s request for skilled workers and for reporting and tracking
purposes, provide referrals that meet the geographic project requirements for low income, and
specific skill set requirements, coordinate and collect monthly reports indicating conformance of
each hiring requirement, and assume full administrative responsibilities for program implementation of hire and apprentice requirements. Project Labor Agreement and Construction Careers
Policy, METRO, https://www.metro.net/about/pla/ [https://perma.cc/D88P-YFWW] (last visited
Sept. 25, 2017).
96
WEI WANG, ET AL., GUIDELINES ON COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE MONITORING TOOLKIT: A
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH PROJECT BY THE LOS ANGELES BLACK WORKER CENTER AND
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (May 15, 2014).
97
L.A. BLACK WORKER CTR., INCREASING LABOR STANDARDS AND DIVERSITY IN LOS ANGELES
THROUGH CO-ENFORCEMENT (2015).
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corridor and can advocate for the goals of the PLA and refer workers to
the jobs coordinators. They are great partners and are providing things
to make our PLA successful,” said Miguel Cabral, Head of Strategic
Business, PLA and Construction Careers.
Due to the peculiar nature of construction, which happens in
stages, it is particularly important to review numbers frequently and
over the entire life of the project. Workers are often hired and employed
to do specific jobs for limited periods of time. Close monitoring and data
analysis meant that the organization was able to note patterns over
time, finding that representation of Black workers had fluctuated dramatically on the project: from a high of 78% in November of 2013 down
to 12% by May of 2014. LABWC was able to raise concerns that Black
workers were being employed largely in the early stages but when site
prepping was finished and prime contractor hours were introduced, the
percentage of Black workers dropped off precipitously, suggesting that
they were not being hired for the long-term work.98
Although very important, from the organization’s perspective,
numbers reveal only part of the story. It wanted to have a finer-grained
view in order to understand the reasons behind the fluctuations.
Through the oversight table, the parties can delve more deeply into
workers experiences. They can make sure that workers don’t get passed
over for employment when they walk up to the jobsite, or are bullied or
pushed out once they are there or quit out of frustration from lack of
information, training or discriminatory treatment on the job.
When we can sit together with the key players, we can figure out
things like: why were three workers fired last week . . . and identify problems that can arise like “I am trying to figure out what
I am supposed to do but the instructions are unclear to me” or
we find out that the safety meetings were conducted only in
Spanish . . . .
said Smallwood Cuevas.
Beyond the oversight table itself, LABWC has won access to all of
the pre-jobs meetings conducted by Metro with contractors, and is working on getting clear signage that provides information about who is in
charge on the jobsite, and gaining access to workers on the jobsite. They
believe that building community and peer mentoring is instrumental to
workers staying on the job. While protocol requires LABWC members

98

2014).

L.A. BLACK WORKER CTR., COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE AND MONITORING REPORT 3 (Apr.
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to undergo safety training and sign in and out with the primary contractor, Metro is very supportive of the organization being able to go on
job sites. “We have been facilitating this process for the BWC because
we want to create a culture of transparency here. We want to put the
most accurate numbers out there that we can, and BWC is doing
that . . .” said Cabral.
From what I have seen them do already in terms of marketing,
referral, in terms of going on site and doing validation, and
providing supportive services to clients who have been placed on
the job, publishing a quarterly report on Metro’s PLA summarizing where we are on each project, they have done a lot. I see
them as a partner on our PLA . . . holding us accountable and
making sure that we are monitoring and enforcing.
LABWC has also been working on setting up a complaint system. It has
received training from the EEOC as well as the DOL on what kind of
information is most useful for bringing cases against contractors that
violate labor standards.
In addition to the work it is doing on the public transit PLA,
LABWC is working with a coalition of organizations to pass a wage theft
law that would create an OLSE-like entity in Los Angeles, would include equal employment opportunity enforcement and have a strong coenforcement component.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the crisis of compliance in low wage
industries will not be solved through enforcement initiatives undertaken by the state alone. Re-embedding norms of compliance will require creative collaboration between government, workers, civil society
organizations and high road firms. Development of effective enforcement models has become increasingly urgent as more labor mandates
are being passed at the local and state levels. Cities are considering
expanding the enforcement role of existing agencies, the establishment
of new institutions, and formal contracts with worker organizations and
legal non-profits to assist in enforcement activities. In regions and sectors where public agencies have historically been weak, innovative
place-based and sector-specific private monitoring regimes linked to
strong market consequences have emerged. Organizations are finding
new pathways to worker power through representation in private inspection regimes, settlement agreements, direct action, worker-toworker education and public policy. Deep collaboration and trust have
been instrumental to the success of co-enforcement efforts, and ongoing
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public relationships between worker organizations and government
bodies are at the center of each of the two cases. Agency leaders and
investigators find that access to workers and their willingness to come
forward greatly increased when they were in relationship with organizations the workers trusted. Likewise, when they felt they could trust
organizations, government officials articulated strong advantages to
working closely with them.
Formalization of Co-enforcement
Organizations playing a formal role have enabled more effective
monitoring and enforcement of labor and employment laws in low-wage
sectors. Government officials are largely positive about what organizations are bringing to the table. Concern on an agency’s part that close
collaboration with civil society organizations could lead to charges of
favoritism or breaches of confidentiality reinforces the importance of
formalization of the relationship with a clear set of rules and procedures. However, while formalization may be necessary, it is not sufficient when the commitment to the collaboration on either side is weak.
In interviews, most worker center and labor leaders expressed a
strong preference for formalization over informal agreements. They felt
that lacking formal agreements, agencies would be less likely to routinely involve the organizations and would proceed instead on an adhoc, case-by-case manner. They were also concerned that if agencies
were not officially committed to providing groups with information, resources, a seat at the table and an ongoing role in monitoring and enforcement, they would fall back on entrenched practices. Additionally,
they worried that without written policies, organizations would be serving at the pleasure of individuals; cooperation could be discontinued at
any time and relationships would not be institutionalized for the longer
run. Informal cooperation, they also felt, made it less likely that their
organizations could alter the relations of power in their sectors and
begin to create a culture of compliance among employers.
Government agencies, for the most part, were more dubious about
formal agreements. Generally speaking, they worried that formalizing
a relationship with a worker organization in particular would jeopardize perceptions of them as neutral parties. There is no doubt that government agencies in the US tend to be uncomfortable with explicit partnerships and formal arrangements with worker organizations.
Generally speaking, they worry that formalizing a relationship with a
worker organization would jeopardize the perception of them as neutral
parties. While beyond the scope of this paper, this “administrative” or
“bureaucratic neutrality” mindset with its deep-seated notions about
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the proper role of state agencies in the US can be traced back to at least
three sources: court-centric ideas of the rule of law as a source of legitimacy were baked into the early administrative state, a strict separation
of politics and administration dating back to Woodrow Wilson, and scientific management principles imported into government administration during the Progressive Era.99
Resourcing Organizations
In the two profiled cases, organizations were paying for their enforcement activities out of existing budgets comprised largely of funding
from foundations. Other case studies profile examples of government
funding playing a key role in a worker organization’s co-enforcement
activities.100 Like formalization, government providing financial support to organizations in order to engage in education and enforcement
activities has been controversial in some quarters. But there is no particular reason that government funding in this area should be any more
controversial than other programs that fund civil society organizations
to operate programs that assist government in achieving its goals.
These grant programs are governed by formal rules—organizations
must apply, they must meet specific selection criteria and are required
to submit regular progress reports. As a practical matter, funding is
necessary because low wage worker organizations are modestly funded,
enforcement-related work is very time-consuming and competes for resources with other critical activities like organizing and service provision.

99

The common law court was enshrined as the ideal against which administrative agencies
were to be judged. The courts’ influence “reached deep into the thought processes of administrators
and taught them to justify their actions in a peculiarly legalistic way.” This mental model combined
with Wilsonian notions of a science of administration and Taylorist tenets of scientific management to become central tropes of the administrative state that emerged in the United States between 1900-1940. Taylor’s “Principles of Scientific Management” helped to create and sustain the
idea of a dichotomy between politics and administration. They formed the basis of the recommendations of President Taft’s 1912 commission on efficiency and economy which sought to implement
the principles of scientific management in government in order to improve its performance. The
first two textbooks on public administration presented the field based on scientific grounds of governance and asserted the importance of scientific principles to public administration. See Wasim
Al-Habil, The Development of the Concept of the ‘One Best Method’ in Public Administration, 2 J.
PUB. ADMIN. & POL’Y RES. 96–102 (2010); DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940 (2014); Woodrow Wilson, The Study of
Administration, 56 POL. SCI. Q. 197–222 (1887).
100
For additional case studies, see Matthew Amengual & Janice Fine, Co-enforcing Labor
Standards: The Unique Contributions of State and Worker Organizations in Argentina and the
United States, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 129 (2017); Janice Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in
Partnership with Civil Society: Can Co-enforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?, 45
POL. & SOC’Y 359 (2017); Janice Fine & Gregory Lyon, Segmentation and the Role of Labor Standards Enforcement in Immigration Reform, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 431 (2017).
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New State Actors
In LA, working with LABWC, the Metropolitan Transit Authority
became the first metropolitan transit authority in the nation to sign a
Project Labor Agreement with affirmative action hiring goals, a construction careers policy and a disadvantaged worker component. In San
Francisco, an entirely new institution has been created that has a broad
mandate and significant powers including the ability to involve other
city agencies in enforcing labor laws. OLSE has substantial investigative capacity and also provides funding for community organizations to
engage in co-enforcement of enforcement. Building a local institution
and involving organizations on the ground in labor standards enforcement is strongly supported by Luce’s research, which documents much
higher levels of compliance with the living wage in cities in which there
was a local government entity involved in enforcement and community
organizations involved in implementation.101
Absence of High Road Employers in Low-Wage Sectors
Strong, collaborative relationships between worker organizations
and businesses have only just begun to emerge. Strikingly, some of
these are with firms that were once highly opposed to the involvement
of workers’ organizations in their sectors, others are with firms at the
top of supply chains that have agreed to require their contractors and
suppliers to comply and cease doing business with them if they do not.
Unfortunately, high road firms joining with civil society and government in strengthening enforcement are rare in sectors that have
adopted low wages, part-time work and just in time scheduling as core
components of their business models. However, business participation
is not always present. These cases—NGA and the warehousing companies in Pennsylvania, and the LABWC, Metro and Walsh-Shea (the general contractor on the Crenshaw Line)—involved worker organizations
going to the top of network supply chains and engaging firms in some
form of co-enforcement, albeit mostly after significant pressure was
brought to bear upon them. In LABWC and Pennsylvania, elected officials or government agencies played a major role in compelling firms to
participate. These developments hold out the promise that the experience of co-enforcement itself might be transformative in terms of how
companies see themselves and wish to be seen by others.

101

See generally STEPHANIE LUCE, FIGHTING FOR A LIVING WAGE (2004).
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Scant Role for Workers in Enforcement
Of those cases that were based upon formal agreements, only one
included an official role for workers at the worksite. OSHA provides individual workers the right to ask for their employer’s health and safety
records and the walk-around rule allows workers to choose their own
representatives. As discussed above, with a presence on every worksite
and experiential knowledge of work processes and employer practices,
workers have unique capabilities to bring to enforcement. They are particularly important to represent in co-enforcement schemes and provide
whistleblower protections to, because many of the most vulnerable
workers are at worksites that are not in relationship with any sort of
worker or community organization. It is critical for local, state and federal labor standards policies and programs to establish new models for
worker voice at the workplace level, as another means for workers to be
empowered to come together collectively to monitor and enforce labor
standards.102
The Connection between Enforcement and Raising Standards
These cases shed light on the relationship between enforcement
and organizing and between defending minimum standards and raising
them. The two organizations profiled here, like the bulk of worker centers across the country, become involved in enforcement of wage and
hour and health and safety laws because so many of the people they
work with have been exploited, and because taking on these cases is a
concrete way to build relationships with workers and gain their trust.
Many times, what begins as a wage claim evolves into a direct-action
campaign on an employer or group of employers, or public policy campaigns at the state and local levels. Wage claims and wage theft campaigns on individual employers are part of a cycle, as organizations
evolve from taking all comers, to requiring workers to participate in the
organization, to treating cases differently depending upon their strategic significance, to ultimately spending the most time on those cases
that will best support a broader campaign to raise standards by spotlighting current conditions.

102

There have been debates within the U.S. labor movement about whether the establishment
of alternative institutions for employee voice at the worksite level will undermine union prospects.
There have also been major legal debates about whether works councils, in particular, would violate the 8a2 prohibition in the National Labor Relations Act against company unions. In the context of Volkswagen’s recent overtures, Harvard law professor Benjamin Sachs has argued that
there are legal strategies for doing so. Benjamin Sachs, Minority Unionism (sort of) Comes to VW
Chattanooga, ON LAB.: WORKERS, UNIONS, & POL. (Nov. 12, 2014), https://onlabor.org/
2014/11/12/minority-unionism-sort-of-comes-to-vw-chattanooga/ [https://perma.cc/863K-BL69].
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Organizations know that for many workers, just ensuring they actually receive the minimum wage is an improvement, and the necessary
first step to raising the floor. They also know they cannot win improvements in a sector unless there is an actual floor to begin with. In the
building trades, garment and janitorial sectors, union organizing campaigns often began the same way—with efforts to rid the labor market
of “bottom-feeders” who engaged in unfair competition through business models that flouted wage and hour and health and safety laws.
Today, low wage worker organizations trace a similar trajectory that
begins with reestablishing a floor. They do this through workers learning their rights under the law and asserting them individually and collectively, gaining the confidence that comes with the state moving into
the labor market in a more aggressive way and validating their claims
of mistreatment. As this work evolves, organizations ratchet up demands on employers beyond statutory minimums. Sometimes it is
through direct action on employers, lawsuits and settlement agreements; sometimes it is through public policy campaigns that enshrine
new rights and wage standards; sometimes it is through unionization
efforts; and often times, it is through combinations of all of them. As
discussed above, regulatory unionism—an approach that combines the
setting of a wage and collective bargaining rights and incentives—encapsulates this approach. This kind of approach is reflected in the Fast
Food Forward and Fight for Fifteen campaigns, which put forward demands for $15 an hour in the fast food and homecare sectors and demand the right to a union for workers in such sectors.
The crisis of compliance in low wage industries will not be solved
through enforcement initiatives undertaken by the state alone. Re-embedding a norm of compliance will require creative collaboration between government, workers, civil society organizations and high road
firms. This study provides concrete evidence for the promise of collaboration between the state and civil society.

